The Secretary Problem and the n/e stopping rule

The basic form of the problem is the following:

imagine an administrator willing to hire the best secretary out of n rankable applicants for a position. The applicants are interviewed one by one in random order. A decision about each particular applicant is to be made immediately after the interview. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled. During the interview, the administrator can rank the applicant among all applicants interviewed so far, but is unaware of the quality of yet unseen applicants.

The question is about the optimal strategy (stopping rule) to maximize the probability of selecting the best applicant.

If the decision can be deferred to the end, this can be solved by the simple maximum selection algorithm of tracking the running maximum (and who achieved it), and selecting the overall maximum at the end. The difficulty is that the decision must be made immediately

The problem has an elegant solution.

The optimal stopping rule prescribes always rejecting the first applicants after the interview (where e is the base of the natural logarithm) and then stopping at the first applicant who is better than every applicant interviewed so far (or continuing to the last applicant if this never occurs).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E_%28mathematical_constant%29

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